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Modern Strategy, by Colin S. Gray
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Modern Strategy explains the permanent nature, but ever changing character, of strategy in light of the whole strategic experience of the twentieth century. The book is a major contribution to the general theory of strategy; it makes sense of the strategic history of the twentieth century, and provides understanding of what that strategic history implies for the century to come.
The book offers a uniquely comprehensive analysis of the different facets of modern strategy. The classic writings of Carl von Clausewitz are reconsidered for their continuing relevance, while possible successors are appraised. In addition to arguing that Clausewitz figured out what strategy was, and how it worked, the book probes deeply into strategy's political, ethical, and cultural dimension. The book explains how strategic behaviour in the twentieth century has expanded from the two-dimensional world of the land and the surface of the sea, to include the ocean depths, the air, space, and most recently the 'cyberspace' environments. It also offers details analyses both of nuclear matters and of the realm of irregular violence.
This is the first comprehensive account of all aspects of modern strategy since the Cold War ended and will be essential reading for all students of modern strategy and security studies.
- Sales Rank: #698658 in Books
- Published on: 1999-11-18
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 6.60" h x .90" w x 9.60" l, 1.65 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 432 pages
Review
There is much that is interesting and good in this book - Richard Hatfield - Policy Director, Ministry of Defence. R U S I Journal - June 2000
An excellent and necessary textbook for the international relations student. THES, February 2000
The Book is a dazzling accomplishment. The Washington,Times March 2000
Modern Strategy is a major contribution to our understanding of strategic theory and practice. The Washington Times, March 2000
Over the years, no writer has addressed the topic of strategy more comprehensively or systematically than Colin Gray. The Washington Times, March 2000
Modern Strategy is his finest effort to date. The Washington Times, March 2000
`Gray has been writing about, professing, or "practicing" strategy for thirty years, and whether or not you agree with him, he is among the few scholars of strategy who should never be ignored.' Mark T. Clark Director, National Security Studies, California State University. Naval War College
Review, Spring 2000
`...his thesis is worth understanding; modern strategy (indeed all) strategy is still a subject worth studying. Anyone interested in learning more about it will benefit from his work.' Mark T. Clark Director, National Security. Naval War College Review, Spring 2000
"The material is so rich in allusion and reference...the approach so novel, the insights often so extraordinary...there are many "brilliant pebbles" of wisdom and insight" Naval Review, April 2001
Covers so much ground...masterfully sets out the relationship between politics, ethics and strategy....Gray's critique is considered and he always draws what is best from the theories he rejects....a dazzlingly brilliant guide to a wide range of issues...Gray writes from the perspective of an
insider in the western military establishment, but even its critics will be informed, entertained and provoked by this book." Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol 76, October 2000
About the Author
Colin Gray is Professor of International Politics and Director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull. He is the author of numerous books on strategy, including The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea (1994), Explorations in Strategy (2nd edn, 1998), and The Second Nuclear Age (forthcoming 1999).
Most helpful customer reviews
32 of 34 people found the following review helpful.
Neo-Clausewitzian Strategic Thought has no peers
By seydlitz89
This book is not light reading. A good background in 20th Century military history as well as Clausewitz is necessary to get the most from this very impressive work. So why bother? What are the uses of Neo-Clausewitzian Strategic Thought?
In the post 9-11 world there is no better way in my opinion to understand the Al Qaida threat. Professor Gray published this work in 1999, but his views and methodology remain as important as ever.
The reason for this is that the grammar of war changes (the ways we fight it, the increasingly complex "elements"), while the nature of war remains the same. Politics and political goals have always been the core reasons for the violent struggle of wills between polities which we call war. That was true in ancient times and remains true today.
Following Clausewitz and Gray I think one could make a very convincing case that Al Qaida is waging war in three forms simultaneously-- guerrilla war, terrorist war and revolutionary war which all put heavy emphasis on the political. With this in mind our MAIN weapon against Al Qaida should be our foreign (political) policy, not an emphasis on high-tech, military responses against obscure targets, the resulting "colateral" destruction only hurting our political policy and playing to the goals of our enemies. Such are the nuances of Clausewitzian strategic thought, far from the "war-as-ideal Mahdi of Mass" strawman usually portrayed by the great strategic theorist's detractors.
Of interest also are Gray's appreciation of the contributions of John R. Boyd, his untangling of the confusion surrounding the term "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and his comments on the little known (or understood) impact of the Second Smuts Report of 1917.
In all this book is a great work in strategic thought of high intellectual merit. Of interest also is a recent article in the Spring issue of Parameters by Gray on Asymmetrical Warfare.
32 of 36 people found the following review helpful.
Fundamental Reading for National Security Dialog
By Robert David STEELE Vivas
Edit of 23 Feb 08 to add links. This book remains priceless & relevant.
First published in 1999, this is an original tour d-horizon that is essential to any discussion of the theory and practice of conflict in the 21st Century, to include all those discussions of the alleged Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the need for "defense transformation", and the changing nature of civil-military relations.
I am much impressed by this book and the decades of thinking that have gone into it, and will outline below a few of its many signal contributions to the rather important questions of how one must devise and manage national power in an increasingly complex world.
First, the author is quite clear on the point that technology does not a revolution make-nor can technology dominate a national strategy. If anything-and he cites Luttwak, among others, with great regard-an excessive emphasis on technology will be very expensive, susceptible to asymmetric attack, and subversive of other elements of the national strategy that must be managed in harmony. People matter most.
Second, and this is the point that hit me hardest, it is clear that security strategy requires a holistic approach and the rather renaissance capability of managing a multiplicity of capabilities-diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, psychological, information-in a balanced manner and under the over-arching umbrella of a strategy.
Third, and consistent with the second, "war proper" is not exclusively about force of arms, but rather about achieving the national political objective by imposing one's will on another. Those that would skew their net assessments and force structure capabilities toward "real war" writ in their conventional terms are demeaning Clausewitz rather than honoring him.
Fourth, as I contemplate in this and other readings how best to achieve lasting peace and prosperity, I see implicit in all that the author puts forward, but especially in a quote from Donald Kegan, the raw fact that it is not enough for America to have a preponderance of the traditional military and economic power in the world-we must also accept the burden and responsibility of preserving the peace and responding to the complex emergencies around the globe that must inevitably undermine our stability and prosperity at home.
Fifth, it is noteworthy that of all the dimensions of strategy that are brought forward, one-time-is unique for being unimprovable. Use it or lose it. Time is a strategic dimension too little understood and consequently too little valued by Americans in particular and the Western alliance in general.
Sixth, it merits comment that the author, perhaps the greatest authority on Clausewitz in this era, clarifies the fact that the "trinity" is less about people, government, and an army, than about primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (the people); chance and probability on the battlefield, most akin to a game of cards (the army); and instrumental rationality (the government)-and that these are not fixed isolated elements, but interpenetrate one another and interact in changing ways over time and space.
Seventh, the author devotes an entire chapter to "Strategic Culture as Context" and this is most helpful, particularly in so far as it brings forward the weakness of the American strategic culture, notably a pre-disposition to isolationism and to technical solutions in the abstract. Perhaps more importantly, a good strategic culture with inferior weapons can defeat a weak strategic culture with an abundance of technology and economic power.
Eighth, and finally, the author courageously takes on the issue of small wars and other savage violence, seeking to demonstrate that grand strategy applies equally well to the savage criminal and warlord parasites that Ralph Peters has noted are not susceptible to our traditional legal and military conventions. While he does not succeed (and notes in passing that Clausewitz's own largest weakness was a failure to catalogue the enemy and the dialog with the enemy as a major factor in strategic success and failure), the coverage is acceptable in making three key points:
1) small wars and sub-national conflicts are generally not resolved decisively at the irregular level-conventional forces are required at some point;
2) special operations forces have a role to play but lack a strategic context (that is to say, current political and military leaders have no appreciation for the strategic value of special operations forces); and
3) small wars and non-traditional threats-asymmetrical threats-must be taken seriously and co-equally with symmetrical regular conflicts.
At the end of the day, this erudite scholar finds common cause with gutter warrior Ralph Peters and gang-warfare iconoclast Martin Van Crevald by concluding his book with a quote from Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "In the Computer Age we will live by the law of the Stone Age: the man with the bigger club is right. But we pretend this isn't so. We don't notice or even suspect it-why surely our morality progresses together with our civilization."
See also (and also my lists):
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations
Security Studies for the 21st Century
War, Peace, and Victory Strategy and Statecraft for The Next Century
Strategy: Process, Content, Context: An International Perspective
War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition
Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (International Series on Materials Science and Technology)
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
The Systems View of the World: A Holistic Vision for Our Time (Advances in Systems Theory, Complexity, and the Human Sciences)
20 of 22 people found the following review helpful.
Stunning account of war and strategy
By William Podmore
This is an outstanding contribution to strategic studies, a comprehensive placing of virtually all theorists and historians of war and strategy, and hugely thought-provoking. Yet Gray never forgets that practice is primary, noting the `authority of practice over theory'.
He uses Clausewitz's method, defining strategy as `the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy': it is about objectives, effects. The nature and function of strategy and war are unchanging, though their characters change constantly. "Every war is both unique yet also similar to other wars." Strategy is in every conflict everywhere.
Tactics, by contrast, is the use of instruments of power in action. Strategy proposes; tactics dispose. "War is not `about' economics, morality, or fighting. Instead, it is about politics."
Strategy's dimension are politics, ethics, military preparations, people, technology, time, war proper. Technological changes alter the character not the nature of war: "Technology is important, but in war and strategy people matter most."
Gray analyses strategy's components, its various environments, land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Seapower, airpower and spacepower function strategically as enabling factors: a war's outcome may be decided by action at sea, in the air or in space, but all conflicts have to be finally resolved on land, where people are.
He illuminates wars from the Punic to the Boer, but focuses mainly on the 20th century's excessive amount of war experience: wars between empires, still all too possible, and wars against nations, opposed by wars for national liberation and independence. He writes, "how truly heroic is Mao's message of eventual success through the conduct of protracted revolutionary warfare." Success can mean just stopping the enemy from winning.
We can check the quality of his approach by assessing the strategic conclusions it generates, despite his overmuch reliance on histories emanating from State Department and Foreign Office. He shows that bombing Germany before defeating the Luftwaffe was a costly error. He proves that the atomic bomb did not defeat Japan in 1945; Japan was already defeated. He praises the Soviet Union's prudent and successful practice of nuclear deterrence.
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